We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else observe nothing. Our experiments show that consistent with the theory, leaders enjoy a greater …rst-mover advantage when followers observe their actions with higher probability. However, the results also show that (i) leaders do not fully exploit their …rst-mover advantage, (ii) when informed, followers tend to overreact slightly (i.e., choose quantities above their best-response to the leaders' quantities), and (iii) when uninformed, followers try to predict leaders' quantities and react optimally.
that the widely used concept of subgame perfection may be highly non-robust and appropriate only in extreme situations in which followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions.
In this paper we report the results of a series of experiments intended to study the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in settings in which followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions. Instead of using the full-support noise structure that Bagwell (1995) assumes, we use an alternative, "all-or-nothing" noise structure, whereby followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions, or else they observe nothing. The main di¤erence between the two noise structures is that under the all-or-nothing structure, followers are fully aware of whether they have observed the leader's true action or not, whereas under the full-support structure, followers always doubt whether they have observed the leader's true action or some other action. The all-or-nothing noise structure is widely used in the literature (e.g., La¤ont and Tirole, 1993, and Rubinstein, 1989) and has the advantage of restoring, at least partially, the …rst-mover advantage (Chakravorti and Spiegel,1993 1 Intuitively, the follower does not observe the leader's action directly and therefore plays a best-response against his belief about the leader's action. In equilibrium, the follower's belief is correct so the follower plays a best-response against the leader's equilibrium action. Since this best-response is independent of the leader's true action, the leader has an incentive to play a best-response against the follower's action and hence the outcome coincides with the equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous move game. 2 Several papers show that the …rst-mover advantage of leaders can be restored even under the full-support noise structure. van Damme and Hurkens (1997) show that the noisy-leader game also admits a mixed strategy equilibrium that converges to the subgame perfect equilibrium as the noise vanishes. Moreover, this equilibrium is selected by
Speci…cally, under the all-or-nothing noise structure, the equilibrium outcome shifts continuously with the probability that followers will observe the leaders' actions from the Cournot outcome (the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game) to the Stackelberg outcome (the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move game). This continuity stands in stark contrast to the situation under the full-support noise structure where the equilibrium outcome jumps discretely from the Stackelberg outcome when there is no noise to the Cournot outcome when there is even the slightest amount of noise. The continuity property implies that as intuition suggests, …rst-movers enjoy a greater strategic advantage when their actions are observed with less noise. Moreover, from an experimental point of view it has the advantage of providing us with a continuous measure of the impact of noise on the ability of leaders to gain a …rst-mover advantage.
We ran 5 sessions, each with 6 leaders and 6 followers who were randomly matched to play a sequential quantity-setting duopoly game. Sessions lasted for 30 rounds, with leaders and followers being randomly matched in pairs at the beginning of every round. The 5 sessions di¤ered only in the probability with which followers observed the leaders' quantity choices (i.e., the noise level). We conducted one "Stackelberg" session in which followers were always informed about the leaders' quantities (Noise0), one "Cournot" session in which followers were never informed about the leaders' quantities (Noise100), and three sessions in which followers were informed about leaders' quantities with probabilities 0:25, 0:50, and 0:75 (Noise25, Noise50, and Noise75, respectively).
In the latter three sessions, each follower was informed in some rounds but uninformed in others.
Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows:
² Underproduction by leaders: On average, leaders chose quantities below their equilibrium quantities in all treatments, although the deviation from the equilibrium quantities was smaller in treatments with higher levels of noise. The tendency of leaders to underproduce became more pronounced as sessions progressed.
² Overproduction by uninformed followers: On average, uninformed followers chose quantities above their equilibrium quantities in all treatments, although the deviation from a "reasonable" selection criterion. Maggi (1999) considers a noisy-leader game in which the leader has private information about his own payo¤. He shows that since the leader has an incentive to choose a "large" action to signal his type, the equilibrium outcome must be close to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when the noise level is small. Oechssler and Schlag (1997) examine an evolutionary model of the noisy-leader game and show that continuous best-response dynamics select the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, although under alternative selection dynamics, the Nash equilibrium outcome is selected.
the equilibrium quantities was smaller in treatments with higher levels of noise. This tendency to overproduce remained stable throughout a session.
² Overreaction by informed followers: On average, informed followers chose quantities above their best-response to the leaders' quantities. Their estimated reaction function had a smaller intercept and was ‡atter than the equilibrium best-response function. The overreaction of informed followers was stronger the bigger was the gap between a leader's quantity and the Cournot output.
The tendency of leaders to underproduce and the tendency of informed followers to overreact are similar to the …ndings in Huck, Müller, and Normann (2001) . They ran experiments on sequential duopoly games with quantity competition and found that on average, leaders choose quantities that are almost halfway between the Stackelberg leader's quantity and the (symmetric)
Cournot quantity, while followers overreacted by about 1 unit to the leaders' quantities. 3 A closer look at the followers' behavior reveals the following:
² Best-response was the modal behavior for followers: The modal behavior of both informed and uninformed followers is to respond optimally to the leaders' quantities. As expected, informed followers played a best-response more than twice as often as uninformed followers (54% of all cases vs. 25% for uninformed followers).
² Time trends: As sessions progressed, informed followers played a best-response less often, whereas uninformed followers played a best-response more often.
² Over-and underreactions: When informed followers did not play a best-response, they almost always overreacted to the leaders' output. In contrast, uninformed followers underreacted in roughly 30% and overreacted in 45% of all cases.
² Persistence of followers' behavior: Followers who overreacted (underreacted) in round t ¡ 1 also tended to overreact (underreact) in round t. The level of persistence was even higher if a follower was uninformed in period t. 3 Weimann, Yang, and Vogt (2000) ran sequential rent-seeking experiments in which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium features a …rst-mover advantage. The results were that leaders not only underproduced, but in fact had a strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis followers.
Taken together, these observations suggest that the soft behavior of leaders may have been a rational response to the aggressive behavior of followers. 4 In particularly, it seems that followers viewed the symmetric Cournot output as "fair" and whenever they were informed, they "punished" leaders who produced more than the Cournot output by overreacting to the leaders' quantities.
Such punishments can be very e¤ective as they entail only a small loss to the follower but hurt the leader substantially. 5 The increasing frequency with which informed followers overreacted to the leaders' output and the persistence in their behavior suggest that as sessions progressed, informed followers "learned" that small overreactions are not very costly for them and/or "acquired a taste"
for "punishing" leaders.
As for uninformed followers, it seems that for the most part, they were trying to estimate the leaders' output and play a best-response against it. This hypothesis is consistent with the observation that uninformed followers played a best-response more frequently as sessions progressed after gaining experience. This implies in turn that followers were willing to "punish" leaders who were trying to exploit their …rst mover advantage only when they were certain that the leaders deserve to be punished. When uninformed, followers accommodated the leaders' behavior even though on average, they correctly predicted that the leaders were exploiting their …rst mover advantage. The persistence of deviations from best response by uninformed followers suggests however that on average, they made systematic errors in predicting the leaders' outputs.
Our …nal …ndings are about the e¤ect of noise on the behavior of leaders and followers:
² Monotonicity of output in the level of noise: With the exception of the Noise50 treatment, the leaders' quantities were monotonically decreasing with the level of noise, and with the exception of the Noise100 treatment (the Cournot treatment), the uninformed followers' quantities are monotonically increasing with the level of noise.
² Impact of noise on the tendency of followers to over-and underreact: The behavior of informed followers was not a¤ected by the level of noise whereas the behavior of uninformed followers was a¤ected by the noise level. 4 This is similar to Harrison and McCabe (1996) who show that soft proposer behaviour in ultimatum experiments seems to be a best response against actual aggressive behaviour by responders. 5 To see why, consider a quantity-setting model with two …rms, A and B, producing a homogenous good. The pro…ts of the two …rms are
, where P (¢) is the inverse demand function, q A and q B are the outputs of …rms A and B and C A (¢) and C B (¢) are their cost functions.
Now, …x an equilibrium outcome (b q
but due to the envelop theorem, it only has a negligeble e¤ect on ¼ B .
Both results are consistent with the theory. Monotonicity is consistent with the fact that under the all-or-nothing noise structure, the equilibrium outcome is a convex combination of the Stackelberg outcome and the Cournot outcome. The result that the behavior of informed followers was not a¤ected by the noise level is consistent with the fact that in equilibrium, informed followers should play a best-response against the leaders' choices irrespective of the ex-ante probability with which they become informed.
Apart from the Huck, Müller and Normann (2001) paper mentioned above, we are aware of only two other experiments on sequential oligopolies. Kübler and Müller (2000) consider a sequential di¤erentiated products duopoly markets with price competition. Unlike with quantity competition, their setting features a second-mover advantage. Moreover, unlike in our experiments, they asked followers to specify a complete response function (strategy method) rather than a single action. The other study is Huck and Müller (2000) , who like us, consider a noisy-leader game.
The di¤erence is that while we consider a game with a large strategy set and an all-or-nothing noise structure, they consider a 2 £ 2 game with a full-support noise structure. With small noise levels, followers seemed to ignore the noise and played a best-response against the observed leader's action even though with some probability this may have been the "wrong" action. Leaders quickly learned to exploit this tendency and played the Stackelberg leader's quantity. With high levels of noise, however, leaders played their Stackelberg quantities only half of the time. The e¤ect of imperfect observability on the ability of players to commit was also studied in the context of strategic delegation both theoretically (e.g., Katz, 1990; Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai, 1991; and Fershtman and Kalai, 1997) and experimentally (Schotter, Zheng, and Snyder, 2000, and Gneezy, 2001 ). However, in that context, the imperfection is in the observation of the contract that one player o¤ers to another who chooses an action on the player's behalf rather than in the observation of the …rst-mover's action as in our study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. The results of the experiments are presented and discussed in Section 3. Concluding remarks are in Section 4. An Appendix contains the written instructions (translation) that were given to the subjects as well as the payo¤ matrix that the subjects were using to make decisions.
A noisy-leader game with all-or-nothing noise structure
Our experiments were based on the following noisy-leader game. Two quantity-setting …rms, A and B, produce a single homogenous good at no cost. The pro…ts of the two …rms are
where a > 0 and q A and q B are the quantity choices of the two …rms. 
The equilibrium strategy of …rm A is de…ned implicitly by the following …rst order condition:
But since in equilibrium, b = q A (…rm B's belief about q A is correct), this condition implies that the equilibrium strategy of …rm A is:
Given b q A ; an uninformed …rm B will choose the quantity
while an informed …rm B will choose the quantity
Note that there is a fundamental di¤erence between …rm B's strategy when it is informed about q A and when it is not: in the former case, …rm B simply chooses a best-response against q A whatever the value of q A is. In the latter case, …rm B does not observe q A and hence it chooses a quantity that depends on …rm A's equilibrium quantity but not on …rm A's actual quantity. The implication of this behavior is that when " = 0 (…rm B is always informed), the game is exactly like a Stackelberg duopoly model with linear demand and marginal cost: …rm A chooses a=2 units which is the monopoly output, while Firm B chooses a=4 units which is half of the monopoly output. At the other extreme where " = 1 (…rm B is never informed), the game is identical to a (positional order protocol of a) Cournot duopoly model and both …rms produce a=3 units. As " increases from 0 to 1, …rm A's quantity falls continuously from the Stackelberg leader's quantity of a=2 to the Cournot quantity of a=3, whereas …rm B's quantity increases continuously from the Stackelberg follower's quantity of a=4 to the Cournot quantity of a=3: 6 Consequently, …rm A enjoys a smaller …rst-mover advantage as " increases towards 1.
At an intuitive level, when " = 0; …rm A commits itself to an aggressive behavior by choosing units. However, it is precisely because …rm A cannot alter its commitment to produce a=2 units that it gains a strategic advantage vis-a-vis …rm 2. As " grows from 0, the probability that …rm B will not observe q A increases. Whenever …rm B does not observe q A ; it acts according to its belief about q A rather than according to the actual value of q A : Holding …rm B's belief, b, …xed, …rm A …nds it optimal to play a best response against b; implying for instance that if …rm B would expect that q A = a=2 and would choose q B = a=4 units, …rm A would have actually preferred to produce only 3a=8 units.
In equilibrium of course, …rm B fully anticipates this and hence, some of the commitment power of …rm A is lost. Firm A does not lose its commitment power entirely because with probability 1 ¡ ", …rm B still observes q A ; in which case it is bene…cial for …rm A to commit to a large output level. 6 In equilibrium, …rm B correctly anticipates q A and hence, q B is the same irrespective of whether …rm B is informed or uninformed about q A .
Experimental implementation
The computerized experiments on the noisy leader game were conducted at Humboldt University using the software tool kit z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) . We ran 5 sessions, each with 12 di¤erent subjects. Subjects were students from various departments at Humboldt University, mainly from Economics, Business Administration and Law. They were either randomly recruited from a pool of potential participants or invited to participate by lea ‡ets distributed around the university campus.
Sessions lasted between 60 and 75 minutes. The average earnings were DM 33:87 which was about $15 or 17:35 Euros at the time of the experiment.
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were assigned a computer screen and received written instructions in German (an English translation appears in the Appendix). After reading the instructions, subjects were allowed to ask clarifying questions that were answered in private. In the instructions, subjects were told that they were to act as a …rm and will be randomly matched in each of 30 rounds with another …rm and that both …rms will choose output levels and will earn pro…ts that were speci…ed in a payo¤ matrix. At the beginning of each session, 6 subjects were randomly assigned the role of …rm A (a leader) and 6 subjects were assigned the role of …rm B (a follower). Players' roles were kept …xed during the entire session. We implemented 5 treatments of the noisy-leader game. In treatment Noise0 (Stackelberg treatment), we set " = 0; so all followers were informed about the quantity chosen by the leader with whom they were matched.
In treatments Noise25, Noise50 and Noise75, " was set at 0:25; 0:50; and 0:75, respectively, so followers were informed in some rounds but not in others. When a follower was uninformed, the computer screen displayed the message "You don't get an information about the quantity produced by …rm A." Finally, in treatment Noise100, we set " = 1; so after the leader made a choice, the follower's screen displayed the message "Firm A has decided, please make your decision now!" 7 At the end of each round, subjects were told about q A , q B , whether or not …rm B was informed about q A , own pro…t in the last round, and own cumulative pro…t.
Apart from written instructions, subjects also received a payo¤ matrix (see the Appendix) 7 Treatment Noise100 corresponds to a Cournot game with a Positional Order Protocol (POP), where followers know that the leaders took actions but not what these actions are. Güth, Huck, and Rapoport (1998) and Müller that speci…ed the pro…ts of …rms A and B for each possible outcome of the game. The pro…ts were expressed in terms of a …ctitious currency called "Taler" and were then converted to DM according to a prespeci…ed exchange rate (see below). In order to ensure that the outcomes were su¢ciently separated from one another without making the payo¤ matrix excessively large, we set a = 60 and asked subjects to choose quantities from the set f13; 14; :::; 32g: 8 With a = 60, the Stackelberg leader's and follower's quantities are 30 and 15 units, respectively, the Cournot output is 20 units, and the symmetric collusive output is 15 units.
Pilot sessions and exchange rates from Taler to DM
Prior to the experiments reported below, we ran 2 pilot sessions for treatment Noise0 (the Stackelberg treatment). Both sessions followed the same rules as described above with two di¤erences.
In the …rst pilot session, all participants had the same exchange rate from Talers to DM, and this was commonly known. The results were such that average quantity of leaders was only 21:32 units, compared with 30 units predicted by theory. More importantly, the estimated reaction function of followers against q A (using a simple OLS regression), was BR B (q A ) = 13:81 + 0:38q A . This function di¤ers signi…cantly from the equilibrium best-response function which is q B = 30¡0:5q A . The main di¤erence is that the slope is positive rather than negative, implying that followers behaved as if strategies were strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes. This is diametrically opposed to the theory since one of the main features of the Cournot/Stackelberg models is that strategies are strategic substitutes. We believe that the result was due to the fact that followers felt that leaders had an undue advantage and therefore "punished" leaders who tried to exploit their …rst-mover advantage by overproducing. 9 In order to neutralize these fairness considerations as much as possible and focus on other aspects of noisy leadership, we ran a second pilot session in which subjects switched roles in every round so that each subject enjoyed a …rst-mover advantage in 15 out of the 30 rounds. Taler. Hence, …rm B hurts …rm A substantially at a small loss to itself. 1 0 Prior to odd rounds, 6 subjects were assigned the role of leaders and 6 were assigned the roles of followers; the leaders and followers were then randomly matched in pairs. In even rounds, the roles were reversed and leaders and in the …rst pilot session, all subjects had the same exchange rate from Talers to DM and this was commonly known. The results in this session were qualitatively similar to the …rst pilot session. The average quantity of leaders was merely 20:09 units, close to the Cournot output of 20 units, and the estimated reaction function of followers was (again, using a simple OLS regression) q B = 17:98 + 0:11q A :
Following the two pilot sessions we decided to assign to each subject an individual and con…dential exchange rate from Talers to DM. The exchange rates were randomly selected from the set f300; 320; 330; 340; 350g (e.g., 300 Talers = DM 1). Before a session started, subjects saw on computer screens a personal message informing them about their own exchange rates, but not about their rivals' exchange rates or the range of possible exchange rates. We felt that if subjects would not know each other's exchange rates, fairness considerations would play a smaller role. To ensure that all subjects were aware of this feature, the personal messages included the following line: "Keep in mind that other participants do not necessarily have the same exchange rate."
Results
With 5 sessions (one for each treatment) of 30 rounds each, and 6 leaders and 6 followers in each session, we have 5 £ 6 £ 30 = 900 leaders' quantity choices, and 5 £ 6 £ 30 = 900 followers' quantity choices. After an initial review of the data, we decided to exclude subject 47 who played as a follower in treatment Noise75. 11 This left us with 870 observations on followers' choices, of which 434 were made by informed followers who saw q A before choosing their own quantities, and 436
were made by uninformed followers who were only told that the leader had already chosen q A but
were not told what the value of q A was.
In Table 1 below, we report for each treatment, the means and standard deviations of the leaders' quantities, q A , the uninformed followers' quantities, q B,uninfo , as well as the equilibrium quantities of leaders, b q A , and uninformed followers, b q B,uninfo . In addition, we report for informed followers were again randomly matched in pairs. 1 1 This subject adopted a highly idiosyncratic predatory behavior by choosing a quantity of 32 units in each of the …rst 4 rounds and a quantity of 30 units in all other rounds. In the post-experimental questionnaire he explained his behavior as follows: "The decisive thought was that in a competition with two contestants the aim must be to weaken the rival in the short run and to take him over in the long run in order to then gain a maximal payo¤ as a monopolist." Since this behavior is self-explanatory and requires no further analysis, we simply decided to ignore subject 47 when analyzing the followers' behavior. Incidently, the suboptimal behavior of subject 47 meant that he ended the experiment with the lowest monetary payo¤ among all 60 subjects.
Treatment
Actual and equilibrium behavior followers the mean and standard deviation of ¢ info i;t´q B,info i;t ¡ BR B (q A i;t ); which is the gap between the actual quantity of informed follower i in round t; and the follower's best-response to q A in that round. According to the theory, we should have ¢ info i;t = 0 for all i and all t. Note that in treatment Noise0, all followers were informed, whereas in treatment Noise100, all followers were uninformed. For obvious reasons, we have more observations on informed followers in treatment Noise25 (127 observations) than in treatments Noise50 and Noise75 (86 and 41 observations, respectively), whereas in treatment Noise75, we have more observations for uninformed followers than in treatments Noise25 and Noise50 (139 observations versus 53 and 94). Table 1 shows that on average, informed followers overreacted to the leaders' quantities and chose quantities that exceeded their best-response by 1:24 ¡ 2:05 units. The table also shows that on average, leaders chose smaller quantities, while uninformed followers chose larger quantities than the theory predicts. Nonetheless, it appears that the comparative statics properties of the noisy-leader model are by and large re ‡ected in the data: with the exception of treatment Noise50, the average quantity of leaders decreases with the level of noise, and with the exception of treatment Noise100, the average quantity of uninformed followers increases with the level of noise. To examine whether the e¤ect of noise on the behavior of leaders and uninformed followers Table 3 : p-values of (two tailed) pairwise cross-treatment di¤erences in the means of q B;uninfo is signi…cant, we conducted pairwise cross-treatment comparisons of the means of q A and q B;uninfo .
The resulting (two-tailed) p-values are reported in Tables 2 and 3 (treatment Noise0 is missing   from Table 3 because in this treatment all followers were informed).
12 Table 2 reveals that with the exception of treatment Noise50 vs. treatment Noise0, all pairwise cross-treatment di¤erences in the means of q A are highly signi…cant. Table 3 shows that the impact of noise on the behavior of uninformed followers is less clear-cut. Di¤erences between the means of q B;uninfo in treatment Noise50 on the one hand and Noise75, and Noise100 on the other hand (second column in Table 3) In what follows we use regression analysis to study the behavior of leaders and followers in more detail and uncover some of the factors that were a¤ecting their behavior.
13 1 2 The p-values were obtained by running OLS regressions across observed quantities, using the treatment as a dummy. For example, to test for di¤erences in leaders' behavior in treatments Noise0 and Noise25, we estimated the equation q A i =¯0 +¯1T REAT +"i, where T REAT is a dummy variable equal to 0 in treatment Noise0 and equal to 1 in treatment Noise25, and "i is an error term. The estimated value of¯1 then represents the di¤erence in means across the two treatments. We use White's (1980) robust standard errors adjusted for possible non-independence of observations within treatments to estimate the covariance matrix. 1 3 Due to the repeated random matchings within each session, only sessions can be regarded as independent ob-
Leaders' behavior
In order to assess leaders' behavior, we estimate the following OLS regression:
where q A j;t is leader j's quantity in round t, ¤ is the set of leaders, 14 and´is an error term. The independent variables in the regression equation are de…ned as follows: , respectively, include overreactions by informed and uninformed followers in the previous round (cases in which followers chose quantities above their best-response). We include these variables in order to examine whether leaders modi…ed their behavior in a given round based on their experience in the previous round. We make a distinction between ¢ +;info j;t¡1 and ¢ +;uninfo j;t¡1 because leaders are likely to interpret the former as deliberate attempts by informed followers to "punish" them while interpreting the latter as re ‡ecting the di¢culty of uninformed followers to predict the leaders' choices. We do servations according to rigorous statistical standards. This would have meant to run at least four sessions for each treatment, at least for the purpose of studying the impact of noise on the behavior of leaders and followers. However, we are quite con…dent that more sessions would not have questioned our main conclusions. In the regression analysis we deal with the possible interdependece of observations within each session by using the cluster option in STATA (see footnote 16 below for more details). 1 4 The set ¤ includes the index numbers of all subjects who played the role of leaders (…rm A): ¤ = fj j j = not make a similar distinction for underreaction because almost all underreactions came from uninformed followers.
² T 2 t and T 3 t ; respectively, are "third" dummies equal to 1 if round t is in the 2nd third of a session (rounds 11¡20) or the 3rd third (rounds 21¡30), and equal to 0 otherwise. Therefore, rounds 1 ¡ 10 serves as the reference group, with the third dummies T 2 t and T 3 t capturing possible time trends in leaders' behavior.
² D A j where j 2 ¤; are leader-speci…c dummies that control for idiosyncratic behavior of leaders. We restrict the sum of the coe¢cients of these dummies to zero. 15 This restriction implies that estimated coe¢cient ® 0 represents the average quantity chosen by leaders, while the estimated coe¢cient of each dummy, ¿ j ; measures the gap between leader j's quantity and the average quantity selected by all leaders.
The results of leaders' regressions are presented in Table 4 . We do not report the coe¢cients of the leader-speci…c dummies since we are only interested in general tendencies rather than in the individual behavior of speci…c subjects. We note however that most of the leader-speci…c dummies were highly signi…cant. Regressions L1-L3 di¤er in terms of the independent variables that are included. In addition, since regression L3 includes lagged variables (¢ ¡ j;t¡1 and ¢ + j;t¡1 ), we lose 5 £ 6 = 30 observations on the leaders' behavior in round 1 of each treatment. Regression L4 uses the cluster option provided by the statistical software package 'STATA' to account for possible interdependencies in the error terms within each treatment cluster. These interdependencies might arise because in each treatment, the same subjects were matched for 30 rounds. The cluster option does not a¤ect the estimated coe¢cients but estimates the standard errors using robust variance matrix calculations that relax the assumption of independence of errors within each cluster. 16 We already saw in Table 1 that leaders tended to underproduce relative to their equilibrium quantities. Since the coe¢cients°1 and°2 are signi…cant, it follows from regressions L2 and L3 that 1 5 This restriction was …rst proposed by Suits (1984) . A discussion on the use of this approach in experimental economics appears in Königstein (2000) . 1 6 Let G1; :::; GM be the M clusters speci…ed in the cluster option. Then, the formula for robust variance calculation used by the cluster option is
where N is the number of observations, k is the number of independent variables in the regression, X is the k £ M matrix of independent variables, and ui = P j2G`e j xj, where ej is the residual for observation j in cluster G`; and xj is a row vector of independent variables for observation j, including the intercept. Table 1 that followers tended to overproduce, the decreasing trend in the leaders' output may have been a rational response to the followers' aggressive behavior. Regressions L3 and L4 reveal however that this response was not immediate as leaders barely reacted to followers' overreactions in the immediately preceding round. If anything, Regression L4 shows that whenever informed followers were aggressive and overreacted, leaders tended to raise their quantities in the immediately following round by an average of 0:05 units for each unit of overreaction by the followers (in regression L3, this e¤ect is not signi…cant). 17 In addition, Regressions L3 and L4 show that whenever followers were soft and underreacted, leaders tended to "reciprocate" by lowering their own output in the immediately following round by an average of 0:217 units for each unit of underreaction by the followers (since ¢ ¡ j;t¡1 is negative by de…nition,¯1 > 0 implies a reduction in q A ). 18 Overall, the estimated values of¯1,¯2; and¯3 suggest that leaders tended to play soft after being "nicely" treated, but showed only a weak tendency to play aggressively after being "mistreated." 19 Turning to the e¤ect of noise on leaders' behavior, regressions L1-L4 show that except for ® 2 , the coe¢cients of the treatment dummies are negative and highly signi…cant, with j® 1 j < j® 3 j < j® 4 j. Hence, with the exception of treatment Noise50, the leaders' output falls when there is more noise, as the theory predicts. Although Tables 1 and 2 already showed a similar trend, here the result is "cleaner" as we also control for the idiosyncratic behavior of individual leaders, for time trends (regressions L2-L4), and for responses to followers' behavior (regressions L3-L4). 20 1 7 We also tried to examine whether there were any time trends in the the leaders' response to under-and overreactions by followers. This was done by multiplying ¢ ¡ j;t¡1 and ¢ + j;t¡1 by the "third" dummies, T 2 t and T 3 t ; and including the new variables in the regression. However, the coe¢cients of the new variables were not signi…cant. In addition, we also included a 2-period lagged value of ¢ j;t in the regression in order to detect delayed responses by leaders to the followers' behavior. This variable however was highly insigni…cant. 1 8 It is important to bear in mind however that since leaders and followers were randomly matched in each round, there was only a 1=6 chance that a leader will meet the same follower again in the next round. 1 9 Underreactions can be interpreted as a "nice" behavior because they bene…t the leader at a personal cost to the follower who produces less than the payo¤ maximizing output. An overreaction can be interpreted as a "mean" or "unkind" behavior because the follower sacri…ces a monetary payo¤ by overproducing in order to hurt the leader. (i) On average, leaders underproduced relative to their equilibrium quantities in all treatments, although the deviation from the equilibrium quantities is smaller in treatments with higher levels of noise.
(ii) The leaders' tendency to underproduce became more pronounced as sessions progressed.
(iii) With the exception of treatment Noise50, the leaders' quantities were decreasing with the level of noise.
Informed Followers' behavior
We now turn to the behavior of informed followers' and estimate their reaction function, using the following OLS regression:
where q B;info i;t is follower i's quantity in round t provided the follower was informed in that round, q A i;t is the quantity of the leader with whom follower i was matched in round t; T 2 t and T 3 t are "third" dummies de…ned as in the leaders' regression, D B i are follower-speci…c dummies, z is the set of followers, 21 and´is an error term. The follower-speci…c dummies a¤ect both the intercept and slope of the best-response function and are intended to control for the idiosyncratic behavior of individual followers. We restrict the sum of the ¿ i 's and the sum of the µ i 's to 0. This restriction implies that the estimated coe¢cients ® 0 and¯represents the intercept and slope of 2 1 The set z includes the index numbers of all subjects who played the role of followers (…rm B), excluding subject 47 whose quantity choices were omitted from the data (see the discussion at the begining of Section 4): z = fi j i = the "average" best-response of informed followers, while the coe¢cients ¿ j and µ j measure the deviation of follower j's behavior from this average. We do not include treatment dummies in the regression since according to the theory, informed followers should play a best-response against the observed leaders' quantities irrespective of the ex ante likelihood that they will be informed. In Subsection 3.4 we will show evidence that indeed there were no cross-treatments di¤erences in the behavior of informed followers.
The results of the informed followers' regressions are presented in Table 5 . As with the leaders' regression, we do not report the coe¢cients of the follower-speci…c dummies but note that most of them were highly signi…cant. 
Observation 2
The estimated reaction function of informed followers had a smaller intercept and was ‡atter than the equilibrium best-response function and remained stable throughout each session.
Uninformed Followers' behavior
To assess the behavior of uninformed followers' we estimate the following OLS regression:
where q A i;t¡1 is the quantity of the leader with whom follower i (who is uninformed in round t) was matched in round t ¡ 1. We include this variable in the regression to examine how uninformed The results of the followers' regressions are presented in Table 6 . Regressions UNINF1-UNINF2 show that uninformed followers reacted with a lag to the leaders' choices and became more aggressive as the leader with whom they were matched in the previous round chose a larger quantity (in regression UNINF3 this e¤ect is not signi…cant). Moreover, Regressions UNINF1-UNINF3 show that uninformed followers tended to choose larger quantities in treatments with larger noise although the relationship is not monotonic. For instance, in Regression UNINF3, the estimated value of ® 2 is larger than the estimated value of ® 3 implying that holding …xed the leaders' quantities in the previous round, uninformed followers chose larger quantities in treatment Noise75 than in Noise100. Regressions UNINF2-UNINF3 show that the behavior of uninformed followers did not change as sessions progressed as the coe¢cients of T 2 t and T 3 t are highly insigni…cant.
Observation 3
The behavior of uninformed followers had the following features:
(i) Uninformed followers become more aggressive the higher the quantity chosen by the leader in the immediately preceding round. ¤ p < 0:1; ¤¤ p < 0:05; ¤¤¤ p < 0:01 Table 6 : Results of the uninformed followers' regressions. t-values in parentheses
(ii) The behavior of uninformed followers remained stable throughout each session.
(iii) Uninformed followers tended to choose larger quantities in treatments with a higher level of noise although the relationship is not monotonic.
Followers' over-and underreactions
In this subsection we study the follower's behavior in greater detail by looking at ¢ i;t which is the gap between the actual quantity of follower i in round t and the follower's best-response to the leader's quantity in the same round. We begin by looking at the distribution of ¢ i;t for informed followers (the solid line) and uninformed followers (the dashed line) across all treatments. Figure 1 shows that the modes of both distributions are equal to 0; implying that irrespective of whether followers were informed or uninformed, their modal behavior was to play a best-response against q A . Not surprisingly however, the mode for informed followers is more than twice as large as the mode for uninformed followers, with informed followers playing a best-response in roughly 54% of all cases, compared with only 25% for uninformed followers. The …gure also shows that the two distributions virtually coincide for ¢ > 0, implying in particularly that informed and uninformed followers tended to overreact to q A at about the same frequency (42% of all cases for informed followers and 45% for uninformed). The main di¤erence between the two distributions is followers that while informed followers almost never underreacted to q A (only 4% of all cases), uninformed followers ended up underreacting to q A in roughly 30% of all cases. 22 In Figure 2 we examine the time trend in ¢ i;t by looking at a break down of ¢ i;t to 1st third (rounds 1¡10), 2nd third (rounds 11¡20t), and 3rd third (rounds 21¡30). The left panel in Figure   2 shows that as sessions progressed, the distribution of ¢ i;t for uninformed followers became more concentrated around 0. In particular, uninformed followers played a best-response against q A ; i.e., chose ¢ = 0, in about 13% of all cases in rounds 1 ¡ 10, 25% in rounds 11 ¡ 20, and 34% in rounds 21 ¡30. These observations suggest that uninformed followers improved their predictions about q A and "learned" to play best-responses against these predictions. The right panel in Figure 2 shows an opposite trend for informed followers: they played a best-response against q A less frequently as sessions progressed (about 64% of all cases in rounds 1 ¡ 10, but only in 49% in rounds 11 ¡ 30).
Instead of playing a best-response, informed followers tended to overreact: In rounds 11 ¡ 20 they overreacted by 1, 2, or 3 units, each in about 10% of all cases, while in rounds 21 ¡ 30 they overreacted by 1, 2, or 3 units, respectively, in 20%, 5%, and 10% of all cases. Bearing in mind 2 2 There is a big variance in the behavior of individual followers. For instance, out of 24 followers who were informed (followers in treatments NOISE0, NOISE25, NOISE50, and NOISE75), 4 always played a best-response and another 2 played a best-response in more than 90% of the cases, while 4 played a best-response in less than 10% of all cases. that small overreactions by followers hurt leaders substantially at a small personal loss to followers (see Footnotes 5 and 9) and recalling from Subsection 3.1 that the average output of leaders fell as sessions progressed, the decreasing time trend of ¢ i;t suggests that as sessions progressed, informed followers "learned" that small overreactions were su¢cient to "discipline" leaders and induce them to play soft.
A …nal breakdown of the distribution of ¢ i;t according to treatments appears in Figure   3 . The …gure shows that the mode of the distribution of ¢ i;t for both informed and uninformed followers is equal to 0 in all treatments. In addition, the right panel reveals that there are no crosstreatment di¤erences in the behavior of informed followers, suggesting that informed followers were
a¤ected only by what they observed but not by the ex-ante probability of this event. And, although the left panel shows several cross-treatment di¤erences in the behavior of uninformed followers, we shall see shortly that these are not statistically signi…cant.
To study the behavior of followers further, we estimated the following OLS regression:
where D B i , i 2 z, are the follower-speci…c dummies that were de…ned in the followers' regression, and´is an error term. The de…nitions of the new independent variables and the reasons for including them in the regression are as follows:
is the gap between the actual quantity of the leader with whom uninformed follower i was matched in round t and the equilibrium quantity of that leader. We include ¢ We include these variables to examine whether the behavior of uninformed followers in round t was a¤ected by leaders' deviations from either their equilibrium quantities or from the Cournot quantity in round t ¡ 1 (note that q A,info i;t¡1 is the most recent observation that uninformed follower i has on leaders' behavior).
² ¢ info
i;t¡1 and ¢ uninfo i;t¡1 , respectively, are the 1-period lagged values of ¢ i;t ; conditional on follower i being either informed or uninformed about q A i;t . These variables are intended to examine whether the behavior of informed and uninformed followers showed persistence.
The results of the ¢ regressions are presented in the following This is consistent with the hypothesis that informed followers viewed leaders who were trying to exploit their …rst-mover advantage as "unfair" and "punished" them by overreacting. Regressions D2-D3 show that the overreaction of informed followers to leaders' quantities above 20 units was present in all treatments as the coe¢cients ® 9 ¡ ® 12 are all highly signi…cant. Moreover, with the exception of treatment Noise50, informed followers overreacted more on average in treatments that had higher noise levels (0:35 units in treatment Noise0, 0:598 units in treatment Noise25, 0:232 units in treatment Noise50, and 0:869 units in treatment Noise75).
As for uninformed followers, it appears from Regression D1 that they did not react to past deviations of leaders from either the equilibrium or the Cournot quantities, as the estimated coe¢cient ® 3 is very small and barely signi…cant, while the estimated coe¢cient ® 4 is not signi…cant.
Regressions D2-D3 show a similar picture as the coe¢cients ® 13 ¡ ® 19 are all insigni…cant as well.
Regressions D1-D3 also show that the behavior of informed, and especially uninformed, followers was persistent since ½ 1 and ½ 2 are both signi…cant and positive with ½ 2 > ½ 1 . If follower i was informed (uninformed) in round t and chose a positive ¢ in round t ¡ 1, then, other things being equal, the same follower chose in round t a ¢ that was 0:097 ¡ 0:125 units (0:33 units) higher than the ¢ chosen in round t by follower k who chose ¢ = 0 in round t ¡ 1. As we discussed above, the persistence of informed followers could be due to inertia or might indicate that they "acquired a taste" for "punishing" leaders. For uninformed followers, the persistence could indicate systematic errors in predicting q A .
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Observation 4 The followers' tendency to over-and underreact can be summarized as follows:
(i) Irrespective of whether followers were informed or uninformed, their modal behavior was to 2 4 We also included a 2-period lagged values of ¢ in fo i;t and ¢ un info i;t in the regression but their coe¢cients were highly insigni…cant. In addition, we also tested for time trends in the evolution of ¢ info i;t and ¢ un info i;t by including the "third" dummies, T 2 t and T play a best-response against the leaders' output. Not surprisingly, however, informed followers played a best-response more than twice as often as uninformed followers (54% of all cases vs.
25% for uninformed followers).
(ii) As sessions progressed, uninformed followers played a best-response against the leaders' outputs more often, whereas informed followers played a best-response less often.
(iii) Informed followers almost never underreacted. Their tendency to overreact was stronger the larger was the gap between the leader's quantity and the Cournot quantity of 20 units. With the exception of treatment Noise50, this e¤ect was stronger in treatments with higher levels of noise. Informed followers did not react to deviations of leaders from their equilibrium quantities.
(iv) Uninformed followers did not react to past deviations of leaders from either their equilibrium or the Cournot quantities.
(v) Followers' behavior showed persistence as followers who overreacted (underreacted) in round t¡1 also tended to overreact (underreact) in round t. The level of persistence was particularly high if a follower was uninformed in round t.
Why were leaders soft?
Having examined the behavior of followers in detail we now return to the leaders' behavior and brie ‡y discuss several possible reasons for why they underproduced relative to their equilibrium quantities.
The …rst reason might be that leaders were trying to induce collusive outcomes by choosing low quantities and thereby invite followers to behave similarly. But since only informed followers are aware of the fact that the leader gave up his …rst-mover advantage, we should expect that leaders will be more inclined to cut their quantities to promote collusion in treatments with less noise. Yet, contrary to this logic, the leaders' quantities were higher in treatments with less noise. Moreover, a large body of experiments on …nitely repeated games shows that subjects tend to collude in early rounds and behave more strategically in the …nal rounds (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986 ). In our experiments however, the output of leaders declined as sessions progressed rather than increased (the coe¢cient of T 3 t in the leaders' regressions is negative and signi…cant). Therefore it appears that the soft behavior of leaders was not motivated by collusion considerations.
Mean reactions of informed and uninformed followers

Noise0
Noise25 Noise50 Noise75 Noise100 Second, it could be that leaders were reluctant to fully exploit their …rst-mover advantage because they do not like inequality. However, it is reasonable to expect that this concern for inequality will greatly diminish (or even disappear completely) if followers do not reciprocate and take advantage of the soft behavior of leaders. That is, it seems reasonable that leaders would not feel bad about exploiting their …rst-mover advantage if they expect that followers will exploit them if they attempt to play collusively. Table 8 shows for each treatment how followers responded when leaders chose quantities below the Cournot quantity of 20 units. These quantities can be interpreted as attempts by leaders to induce collusive outcomes that give both players higher pro…ts than they can get at the Cournot outcome.
As Table 8 shows, in 40 out of 41 times in which leaders chose quantities strictly below 20 units, informed followers responded with quantities that exceeded those selected by the leaders and therefore ended up getting a larger pro…t than the leaders. Based on this observation, it might be thought that as sessions progress, leaders will begin to exploit their …rst-mover advantage more
often. Yet, the coe¢cient°2 in the leaders' regressions was negative and signi…cant, implying that exactly the opposite happened: as a session progressed, leaders chose smaller and smaller quantities and exploited their …rst-mover advantage to a lesser degree.
This brings us to the third possible reason which is that the soft behavior of leaders was a rational response to the aggressive behavior of informed followers. According to this hypothesis, leaders were reluctant to fully exploit their …rst-mover advantage because they wanted to avoid costly punishments by followers (recall from Footnotes 5 and 9 that the follower's punishments are proportional to the leader's action). This hypothesis is consistent with the observations that followers overreacted (i.e., chose ¢ > 0) in roughly 45% of all cases (401 out of 900 cases) and underreacted (i.e., chose ¢ < 0) in only 17:5% of the cases (158 out of 900 cases) and that informed followers tended to overreact more the farther away was the leader's quantity from the Cournot output of 20 units.
Conclusion
Sequential decisions in markets are probably the rule rather than the exception. But in practice, early choices are not always perfectly revealed to rivals. This begs the question of how players behave in sequential strategic situations with imperfect observability. Studying such strategic situations empirically is extremely di¢cult, however, due to obvious limitations of available data sets. In this paper we study this issue with a controlled experiment under the assumption that followers either perfectly observe the leaders' choices or else they observe nothing.
Our experiments yield several important observations. First, punishments by followers are very e¤ective since a small overreaction to the leaders' choice entails only a negligible loss to the follower while in ‡icting a large loss on the leader which is proportional to the leader's quantity.
Consequently, as leaders choose larger quantities, they become more susceptible to follower's deviations from best-response. This property, which has been almost completely neglected in the Industrial Organization literature, suggests that in sequential games in which strategies are strategic substitutes (like the duopoly game that we have considered), it is reasonable to expect leaders to play more cautiously than the theory predicts. This is particularly so in noisy-leadership games in which followers may remain uninformed about the leaders' choices and may therefore overreact to the leaders' choices inadvertently. 25 Second, informed followers are willing to sacri…ce small amounts in order to hurt leaders who try to exploit their …rst-mover advantage. In particularly, the willingness of informed followers to "punish" leaders is greater the farther away is the leader's choice from the symmetric Cournot outcome.
Third, it seems that followers do not try to "punish" leaders when they are uninformed, even if on average, they seem to correctly predict that the leader's quantities exceed the symmetric Cournot output. Instead, they seem to simply try to play a best-response against their prediction on the leader's choices. This suggests that followers punish leaders who try to exploit their …rst-mover advantage only when they are certain that the leaders' deserve to be punished. When uninformed, followers accommodate the leaders' behavior even if they would have punished it had they observed it. 26 In other words, it seems that followers punish only "what they see" but do not punish "what they do not see," even if on average they correctly anticipate the leaders' choices.
A similar behavior has been observed in ultimatum experiments in which only proposers know the actual size of the pie: when the pie turns out to be large, most proposers o¤er exactly one half of the small pie and are never punished, even though the large pie is twice as likely implying that with a high probability the proposer's o¤er is in fact "unfair" (see Güth, Huck, and Ockenfels, 1996) . 2 6 A case in point is subject 31 who played as a follower in treatment Noise50 and wrote in the post-experimental questionnaire: "As a B-…rm one can only try to push down A's pro…t if one knows its quantity and to try to optimize the own pro…t if A's quantity is not known."
its quantity …rst (selects a line in the table) and the B-…rm will not be informed about the A-…rm's choice. Not knowing the quantity produced by the A-…rm, the B-…rm then decides on its quantity (selects a column in the table).
This procedure is repeated over thirty rounds. You do not know the participant with whom you serve the market. In each round you will be randomly matched with another participant such that always one A-…rm and one B-…rm will meet. That is, if you are an A-…rm you will always be matched with a B-…rm and vice versa.
After each round you will be informed about the quantity of the other …rm as well as about your pro…t in the previous round and your total payo¤ so far.
The experiment will be conducted at the computer. This guarantees both anonymity between all participants and anonymity between you and the experimenter since your decisions can not be assigned to your person.
Your total payo¤ will be determined by the sum of your own payo¤s in each round.
The exchange rate from Taler to DM valid for you will be displayed on the computer screen.
Payo¤ matrix
To save space, the payo¤ matrix presented here shows only the payo¤s of the row player. The matrix that was used in the experiments showed the payo¤s of both the row and the column players. 
